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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Joanne N. Christofferson pleaded guilty to felony
vehicular manslaughter.  Ms. Christofferson filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2 (“Rule
12.2”) motion for additional defense services, requesting a psychological examination to
assist for mitigation purposes at sentencing.  The district court denied the Rule 12.2
motion.  The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed.
On appeal, Ms. Christofferson asserts the district court abused its discretion when it
denied her Rule 12.2 motion.
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argues Ms. Christofferson has not shown the
district court abused its discretion when it denied her Rule 12.2 motion, and that if the
district court abused its discretion, the error was harmless.  (Resp. Br., pp.6-14.)  This
Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s arguments, which are unavailing.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Christofferson’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief,
but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Christofferson’s Idaho
Criminal Rule 12.2 motion for additional defense services?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Christofferson’s Idaho
Criminal Rule 12.2 Motion For Additional Defense Services
A. Introduction
Ms. Christofferson asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied
her Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2 motion for additional defense services.  The district court
denied the Rule 12.2 motion after determining the services requested would be
duplicative of the I.C. § 19-2524 screening and possible mental health examination that
had already been ordered.  (R., pp.136, 138.)  However, the psychological examination
services requested by Ms. Christofferson were not duplicative of the Section 19-2524
screening and mental health examination, because the requested psychological
examination was to assist Ms. Christofferson in preparing for sentencing.  In contrast,
the Section 19-2524 screening and mental health examination were mainly to benefit
the district court.  Because the district court did not recognize this distinction, it did not
act consistently with the applicable legal standards.  Thus, the district court abused its
discretion when it denied Ms. Christofferson’s Rule 12.2 motion.  The State has not met
its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the district court’s denial of the Rule
12.2 motion was harmless.
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion Because It Did Not Act Consistently With
The Applicable Legal Standards
Ms. Christofferson asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied
her Rule 12.2 motion for additional defense services, because the district court did not
act consistently with the applicable legal standards.  Under the constitutional standards
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for providing additional defense services, as implemented by Rule 12.2, the provision of
assistance at public expense is required where necessary for a fair trial and a
meaningful opportunity to present a defense. See Ake v. Oklahoma,  470  U.S.  68
(1985); State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391 (1982).  Thus, contrary to the district court’s
determination, the psychological examination services requested by Ms. Christofferson
were not duplicative of the I.C. § 19-2524 screening and mental health examination,
because the requested psychological examination was to assist Ms. Christofferson in
preparing for sentencing.  Conversely, the I.C. § 19-2524 screening and mental health
examination were mainly for the benefit of the district court.  Because the district court
did not recognize this distinction, it did not act consistently with the applicable
legal standards. See State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).
In the Respondent’s Brief, the State argues, “[w]hile the underlying purposes
behind Idaho Code § 19-2524 and Rule 12.2 may be different, there is no substantive
difference between what [Ms.] Christofferson requested in her particular Rule 12.2
motion and what is provided for under Idaho Code § 19-2524.”  (Resp. Br., p.9.)
According to the State, Ms. Christofferson did not “actually articulate how the end result
of these two examinations would be any different.  Nor can she.”  (Resp. Br., p.9.)  The
State contends “[t]here is no difference between the ‘comprehensive’ psychological
evaluation [Ms.] Christofferson requested and ‘in-depth evaluation’ contemplated by
I.C. § 19-2524.”  (Resp. Br., p.10.)
This argument by the State fails to acknowledge what the United States Supreme
Court recognized in Ake: “Psychiatry is not . . . an exact science.” See Ake, 470 U.S. at
81.  The Ake Court stated “psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently . . . on the
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appropriate diagnosis to be attached to given behavior and symptoms . . . .” Id.  In
another context, the Idaho Supreme Court has also recognized that psychiatry is not an
exact science. See State v. Myers, 94 Idaho 570, 580 (1972) (“[I]f psychiatry were an
exact science with regard to uniformity of theories, diagnoses and conclusions among
its practitioners, there could be more of a rationale for making such opinion testimony
binding upon the jury.  Such does not appear to be the case and much of the literature
in the field indicates deep-seated conflict between the various practitioners.”).
The State’s argument presupposes that psychiatry is an exact science,
suggesting the psychological examination services requested by Ms. Christofferson and
the Section 19-2524 screening and mental health examination would arrive at the same
diagnoses, because they would both “result in a complete evaluation of the defendant’s
mental condition to inform the court’s sentencing decision.”  (See Resp. Br., p.10.)  The
State’s contention flies in the face of the United States Supreme Court’s and Idaho
Supreme Court’s common understanding that psychiatry is not an exact science, and
that psychiatrists may disagree on the appropriate diagnosis to be attached to given
behavior and symptoms. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 81; see also Myers, 94 Idaho at 580.
The State’s argument also ignores an important substantive difference between
Section 19-2524 screenings and mental health examinations, and psychological
examination services requested under Rule 12.2.  Unlike a mental health expert
appointed to assist a defendant pursuant to Rule 12.2, a Section 19-2524 screening
evaluator or mental health evaluator would not “assist in evaluation, preparation, and
presentation of the defense,” see Ake, 470 U.S. at 83, nor would the Section 19-2524
evaluator furnish “certain specialized aid in the preparation of a defense.” See Olin, 103
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Idaho at 394.  For example, psychiatrists “know the probative questions to ask of the
opposing party’s psychiatrists and how to interpret their answers.” Ake, 470 U.S. at 80.
While a mental health expert appointed under Rule 12.2 could render such assistance
to a defendant like Ms. Christofferson, Section 19-2524 does not allow a screening
evaluator or mental health evaluator to help a defendant in that way. See generally
I.C. § 19-2524.
The State’s argument fails to acknowledge that psychiatry is not an exact
science, and ignores the important substantive difference that Rule 12.2 mental health
experts may assist defendants in ways Section 19-2524 evaluators may not.  The
district court abused its discretion when it denied Ms. Christofferson’s Rule 12.2 motion
for additional defense services.  The State’s argument to the contrary is unavailing.
C. The State Has Not Met Its Burden Of Proving Beyond A Reasonable Doubt The
District Court’s Denial Of Ms. Christofferson’s Rule 12.2 Motion Was Harmless
Ms. Christofferson asserts the State has not met its burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt the district court’s denial of her Rule 12.2 motion was harmless. See
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010).
On harmlessness, the State asserts, “[t]he district court’s sentence would not
have changed if there had been an additional mental health evaluation.”  (Resp.
Br., p.11.)  But Ms. Christofferson only went through an I.C. § 19-2524 screening.  (See
PSI, pp.47-49; Tr., p.88, L.11 – p.89, L.12.)  Despite the indications that
Ms. Christofferson had a serious mental illness, she never had a full mental health
evaluation as required by Section 19-2524(3)(a).  (See PSI, p.47; Tr., p.73, L.9 – p.75,
L.2, p.96, Ls.12-16.)
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The State also asserts, “[t]he district court had information regarding
[Ms.] Christofferson’s mental health when it made its sentencing decision.  It is not clear
what additional information would have been contained in a second psychological
evaluation.”  (Resp. Br., p.12.)  However, the Section 19-2524 screening, based on
Ms. Christofferson’s GAIN evaluation, contained a diagnosis of “Rule Out –
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder or Acute Stress Disorder or other disorder of extreme
stress.”  (PSI, p.47; see PSI, p.36.)  The screening explained “the term ‘rule out’ is
commonly used by IDOC staff or contracted GAIN assessors when the assessor is not
licensed to diagnose mental illness.  The use of ‘rule out’ indicates that the diagnosis as
generated by the GAIN, is provisional.”  (PSI, p.47.)  A full psychological examination as
requested could have gone beyond the provisional “Rule Out” diagnoses of the
screening to determine whether Ms. Christofferson actually suffered from posttraumatic
stress disorder or acute stress disorder.  Further, Ms. Christofferson reported she had
previously been diagnosed with bi-polar disorder (PSI, pp.15-16), and a full
psychological examination could have determined whether she had that condition
as well.
Additionally, the State asserts that “even if the district court had permitted an
additional psychological evaluation, it is not clear whether [Ms.] Christofferson would
have even wanted one.”  (Resp. Br., pp.12-13.)  However, Ms. Christofferson told her
counsel that she did not want an evaluation only after the completion of the presentence
report (see Tr., p.85, L.17 – p.86, L.5)—that is to say, after the district court abused its
discretion in denying her Rule 12.2 motion and the Idaho Department of Correction
failed to get her a full mental health evaluation as required by Section 19-2524.  (See
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Tr., p.73, L.9 – p.75, L.2, p.96, Ls.12-16.)  Thus, whether Ms. Christofferson would have
wanted a psychological evaluation after the completion of the presentence report is not
relevant to the issue of whether the district court’s abuse of discretion in denying her
Rule 12.2 motion contributed to the sentence.
In light of the above considerations, the State has not met its burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt the district court’s denial of Ms. Christofferson’s Rule 12.2
motion was harmless. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.  The State’s argument that any
error was harmless is unavailing.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief,
Ms. Christofferson respectfully requests this Court vacate her judgment of conviction,
reverse the district court’s order denying her Rule 12.2 motion, and remand the case for
further proceedings.
DATED this 23rd day of January, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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